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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Donald Shane Brink appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The facts of the underlying criminal case were set forth by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals in Brink's prior appeal: 
Brink left his van, with personal property stored inside, at the 
home of an acquaintance. His van was broken into and some of 
his personal property was stolen. Soon thereafter, his van also 
disappeared. He inquired of the occupants of the home, and they 
indicated that Brent Lillevold had taken his van. In the ensuing 
days, Brink issued profanity-laced threats of death or serious injury 
against Lillevold on several occasions. Brink was seen sawing off 
the barrel of a shotgun and working with the stock and trigger 
assembly. He later hid a sawed-off shotgun behind the washing 
machine at the home where his van was stolen. Brink became 
obsessed with getting his van back and stated to several people his 
intention to exact revenge on Lillevold. 
On May 29, 2005, Brink drove to the acquaintance's home 
where his van was stolen. He heard the voices of Lillevold's 
girlfriend and another acquaintance in a room and reasoned that 
Lillevold was also present. He retrieved the shotgun from behind 
the washer and entered the room. Brink threatened Lillevold and 
demanded that Lillevold retrieve his van. When Brink later 
demanded to be taken to his van, an argument ensued between 
Brink, Lillevold, and Lillevold's girlfriend regarding gas money. 
Lillevold's girlfriend rummaged through her purse and appeared to 
try to give the purse to Lillevold. Brink fired the shotgun and the 
round struck Lillevold in the chest, killing him almost instantly. 
Brink was charged with first degree murder with an enhancement 
for using a deadly weapon, I.C. §§ 18-4001 to -03, 19-2520, and 
being a persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514. 
Prior to trial, despite being represented by court-appointed 
counsel, Brink filed a number of prose motions. These included a 
motion to correct pre-trial constitutional deprivations, two motions to 
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disqualify counsel for cause, a motion for appointment of qualified 
counsel outside of the public defender's office, and a motion for 
mandatory and prohibitory injunctive relief and show cause hearing. 
Brink also sent several ex parte letters to the district judge and 
court clerk regarding his motions and also complaining about his 
conditions of confinement. The district court held hearings on 
Brink's motions regarding counsel, which Brink later withdrew. The 
district court declined to rule on the other prose motions, reasoning 
that Brink's complaints regarding, among other things, conditions of 
confinement, limitations of his freedom at the jail, constitutional 
deprivations and limited access to legal materials, were civil 
matters which would be properly addressed through an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court additionally 
instructed Brink that, in order to avoid confusion, it would not 
consider any additional pro se motions so long as he was 
represented by counsel. Brink, through his counsel, filed a motion 
to exclude from evidence videotape and photographs of the crime 
scene that depicted the body of the victim, as well as photographs 
taken at the autopsy. The district court denied Brink's motion, 
concluding that the videotape and photographs were relevant 
evidence and that their probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
A jury found Brink guilty of first degree murder with an 
enhancement for using a deadly weapon as well as being a 
persistent violator. Brink filed a motion for a new trial, which the 
district court denied after a hearing. The district court sentenced 
Brink to a unified term of life imprisonment plus thirty years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of thirty years. 
State v. Brink, Docket No. 34391, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 702, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App., November 7, 2008) (review denied). 
In that appeal, Brink "challeng[ed] the district court's denial of his motion 
to suppress the videotape and photographs depicting the victim's body." kl at 3. 
Brink argued that "the playing during opening statements of the videotape, which 
was not later admitted into evidence, violated his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in using the 
videotape and photographs in his opening statement and closing argument and 
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during the course of trial." kl Brink also argued that "his constitutional rights 
were violated when the district court refused to accept additional pro se filings 
while he was represented by counsel and when it failed to dismiss the criminal 
complaint against him as a remedy for his alleged constitutional deprivations in 
the conditions of r1is confinement." kl 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that "[t]he videotape and photographs of 
the crime scene, including images of the victim's body, were relevant and their 
probative value was not substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect." lg__,_ 
at 12. In discussing the relevance of this evidence, the Court of Appeals noted 
that: 
At trial, Brink relied on self-defense and justifiable homicide 
as the foundation of his defense. Thus, in addition to proving 
corpus delicti of the crime, the evidence is relevant if it had any 
tendency to prove or disprove Brink's state of mind regarding his 
need to defend himself. Trial counsel for Brink and the state spent 
considerable time presenting evidence at trial regarding whether 
the victim was coming at Brink at the time the shot was fired. 
Blood splattering, bleeding patterns, the position of the body with 
floor measurements for perspective, and the size of the wound 
were all relevant considerations in this determination. 
kl at 5. 
The Court of appeals also held that: ( 1) "[t]he use of the videotape in 
opening statement, which was not later admitted into evidence, did not violate 
Brink's Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and 
assistance of counsel;" (2) "[t]he prosecutor's use of the relevant and admissible 
videotape and photographs of the crime scene, including images of the victim's 
body, in his opening statement and closing argument and throughout the course 
of trial was not intended to inflame the passions of the jury and did not constitute 
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misconduct;" and (3) "[t]he district court's refusal to accept additional pro se 
filings while Brink was actively represented by counsel, and its failure to dismiss 
the criminal complaint as a remedy for alleged constitutional deprivations in the 
conditions of his confinement, limitations of his freedom at the jail, and limited 
access to legal materials, did not violate any of Brink's constitutional rights." _kl 
at 12. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
On January 11, 2010, Brink filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp.6-10.) Counsel was appointed for Brink and the state filed a motion for 
summary disposition alleging that the petition was untimely. (R., pp.552, 562-
63.) The district court issued is own notice of intent to dismiss on the same 
grounds. (R., pp.566-67.) Thereafter, Brink filed documentation showing that 
riis petition had been timely filed pursuant to the "mailbox rule." (R., pp.569-71, 
585-93.) The district court found that Brink's filing was timely, withdrew its notice 
to dismiss and denied the state's motion. (R., pp.602-04.) 
The state filed a second motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.610-12.) 
Brink then filed a motion to proceed pro se. (R., pp.614-18.) Following a 
telephonic hearing, the district court granted Brink's motion to represent himself 
and directed Brink to file an amended petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
pp.675-77.) Brink filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
pp.693-721.) The state filed an answer and a third motion for summary 
disposition. (R., pp.796-816.) Following a hearing on the state's motion for 
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summary dismissal, the district court granted the state's motion and summarily 
dismissed the petition. (R., pp.891-914.) 
The district court appointed counsel to represent Brink and Brink timely 
appealed. (R., pp.927-33.) Brink's counsel filed a motion to withdraw and Brink 
filed a motion to proceed prose. (Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and 
to Allow Appellant to Proceed Pro Se, filed September 19, 2011; Motion to 
Proceed Pro Se and Affidavit in Support, filed September 22, 2011 ). The Idaho 
Supreme Court granted the motion to withdraw and allowed Brink to proceed pro 
se on appeal. (Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and 
Allow Appellant to Proceed Pro Se, dated October 24, 2011.) 
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ISSUES 
Brink states the issues on appeal as: 
ISSUE ONE 
WAS THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF MY PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, AND WITHOUT 
EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, AND GRANTING OF THE STATES 
[sic] THIRD MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, 
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR, PLAIN ERROR, AND/OR A COMPLETE 
DENIAL OF FAIR DUE PROCESSES AND A VIOLATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS? 
ISSUE TWO 
WAS I DENIED AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, A FAIR TRIAL, 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW, 
AND/OR ACCESS TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENTIARY 
PROCESSES THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR PRESENTING 
SUCH A DEFENSE, WHICH CREATED FUNDAMENTAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR, IN PART DUE TO INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND/or DEPRIVATION OF MY 
RIGHT TO APPEAR AND DEFEND IN PERSON OR MYSELF? 
(Appellant's brief, p.ii.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Brink failed to establish that the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his amended petition for post-conviction relief? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
Brink Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It Summarily 
Dismissed His Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Brink claims "that the cumulative effect of the prejudices beset by the 
states [sic] misconduct, and the failure of counsel to object, present, or protect 
my defense, resulted in a complete denial of a fair trial, due processes, and 
protections of the constitution's [sic]." (Appellant's brief, p.52.) Brink further 
claims that "[a]t the very least, disputed material facts existed, of the court's 
assessment, and therefore an evidentiary hearing and non-conflict counsel 
should have been appointed, to present the full case at hearing should have 
been forthcoming." (Appellant's brief, p.53.) Review of these claims 
demonstrates that Brink has shown no error in the summary dismissal of his 
petition because all of his claims were properly dismissed as waived or resolved 
in the criminal proceedings, without a factual basis, or both. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. ~ However, the 
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
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unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Ferrierv. State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001). 
C. Brink Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claims 
Because They Were Either Barred Or Because He Failed To Present Any 
Factual Basis For The Claims 
The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCPA") "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction." 
I.C. § 19-4901 (b). In addition, an "issue which could have been raised on direct 
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings" except under very limited circumstances. I.C. § 19-4901 (b). The 
plain language of these statutory provisions indicates that matters that could and 
should have been addressed in the criminal case or on direct appeal are not 
properly brought under the UPCPA. See Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188, 190-
91, 868 P.2d 516, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider issues that 
should have been raised on direct appeal). Thus, all issues that were 1 or could 
have been addressed in the underlying criminal case are waived and cannot be 
asserted in post-conviction proceedings. 
Even if not barred, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary 
dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if the applicant "has not presented evidence 
making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which 
1 Issues actually decided in the criminal case are also barred by principles of res 
judicata. See State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000); 
Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 107, 110, 867 P .2d 981, 984 (1994). 
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the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 
P.2d 738, 739 (1998). The factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct. App. 
1982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 824, 702 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel a claimant must prove both that 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient and that prejudice arose from 
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Giles v. 
State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 
Idaho 428, 432, 788 P.2d 243, 247 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Application of these legal standards to Brink's claims shows that the 
district court properly dismissed Brink's petition. On appeal, Brink contends that: 
In order for me to obtain relief, I must show that had my 
attorney's [sic] set forth objections to the prosecutorial misconduct, 
jury instructions, Miranda violation, changing of the grand jury 
testimony, and objected to the denial of access to the court I was 
suffering from; as well as investigating the case and investigating 
my theory of a defense, interviewed all the witnesses without 
threats and intimidation, investigated the thefts, threats, and 
actions against me and my family, and obtained expert witnesses 
to show conclusively where I and Lillevold were positioned at the 
time of the attack against me, and developed the evidence at the 
crime scene that pointed to an attack, and simply investigated the 
actual and real residence of the intruder theives [sic], and defended 
me with an affirmative defense, along with proper jury instructions 
defining pursuant to law and right, what a real affirmative defense 
is, and at the least, shifting the burden of proof without causing 
prejudice and deprivation of exculpatory evidence and denial of 
due processes to me, the verdict would have been different. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.) Brink argues that "presentation of the above 
defenses and preparation and investigation as was requested by me provided to 
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the record and brought on appeal, the Appeal Court might have vacated" and 
that "[w]ith sufficient allegations in the application the district court was required 
to hold a hearing on all the claims." (Appellant's brief, p.29.) 
These arguments, as well as Brink's claims in his amended petition for 
post conviction relief, were all sufficiently addressed in the post-conviction 
proceedings and the district court correctly found that "summary dismissal is 
appropriate in this case because Brink raises no genuine issue of material fact 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested 
relief." (R., p.910.) 
In Brink's amended petition for post-conviction relief, he asserted five 
main "issues"2 or claims. (R., pp.699-720.) Brink's first claim was that the district 
court denied him of his right to assert an affirmative defense of justifiable 
homicide or self-defense by improperly instructing the jury. (R., p.699.) Brink's 
allegation of improper jury instructions and the other issues raised in this portion 
of his petition should have been raised on direct appeal and are procedurally 
barred pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901. See Gootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 364, 924 
P.2d 622, 626 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that "the sufficiency of the information 
and the correctness of the jury instructions are issues which could have been 
raised on direct appeal, but were not, and are, therefore, forfeited and not to be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings."). 
Furthermore, the record is clear that Brink was not prevented from 
asserting an affirmative defense of justifiable homicide or self-defense. 
2 Brink also set forth numerous sub-issues that will not be repeated here. 
10 
"Throughout his criminal case [Brink] asserted, and continues to assert, that he 
shot the victim in either self defense or because he was justified in doing so to 
protect his children who were not present at the scene." (R., p.898.) Brink also 
asserted that "he was entitled to shoot the victim because the victim had stolen 
his property" and "he had the right to shoot the victim because he was retrieving 
his property" from the victim. (R., p.898.) As the district court found, "Brink not 
only presented these defenses through a number of witnesses at trial, but he 
also testified extensively as to these defenses."3 (R., p.898.) 
Brink has failed to allege facts showing that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in presenting these defenses or that trial counsel should have 
objected to the jury instructions that were given. Brink has also failed to allege 
facts showing that appellate counsel should have raised these issues on appeal. 
There is no evidence in the record that the jury was improperly instructed and 
Brink was not prevented from presenting the affirmative defenses of justifiable 
homicide and self-defense. (See generally #34391 Trial Tr., p.2, L.1 - p.1018, 
L.25; see also R., pp.387-88, 405-09.) Therefore, Brink's claims under "Issue 
One" were properly dismissed by the district court. 
Brink's second claim was that he was prejudiced and he was denied a fair 
trial through the improper statements made by the prosecutor to the jury during 
opening and closing arguments and that his trial counsel and appellate counsel 
3 The Idaho Court of Appeals discussed the fact that "[a]t trial, Brink relied on 
self-defense and justifiable homicide as the foundation of his defense." State v. 
Brink, Docket No. 34391, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 702, p.5 (Idaho App., 
November 7, 2008) 
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were ineffective for failing to object and for failing to raise this issue on direct 
appeal. (R., p.703.) Although this claim is phrased in terms of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Brink's argument focused on his allegation that the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by "misinforming the jury as to the law" and 
by "misconstruing the facts." (R., p.706.) Brink also alleged that the prosecutor 
withheld evidence that the victim did not live in the house where Brink shot and 
killed the victim. (R., pp.705-07.) 
Brink's allegations regarding prosecutorial misconduct raise issues that 
could have been raised on direct appeal. To the extent that any of Brink's 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were not presented due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the allegations are not supported by the record and Brink 
has failed to allege facts that would establish prejudice. The district court 
"reviewed the entire trial transcript" and found that "there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct in the criminal trial." (R., p.901.) The Court of Appeals also found 
that there was no prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the claims Brink 
brought on direct appeal. State v. Brink, Docket No. 34391, 2008 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 702, pp.7-10 (Idaho App., November 7, 2008). Therefore, Brink's 
claims under "Issue Two" were properly dismissed by the district court. 
Brink's third claim was "a constitutional challenge to the way Idaho 
presents it's [sic] jury instruction to consideration of lesser included offenses, 
which in all instances dictates that the jury must first consider the severest 
degree or the elements of the crime as charged before it may consider what is 
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considered lesser included offenses." (R., p.708). This claim should have been 
brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred. 
Furthermore, I.C. § 19-2132(c) specifically provides that "the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may not consider the lesser included offense unless it has 
first considered each of the greater offenses within which it is included, and has 
concluded in its deliberations that the defendant is not guilty of each of such 
greater offenses." "The propriety of [I.C. § 19-2132(c)] has been recognized in 
Idaho." (R., p.902 (citing State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Hudson, 129 Idaho 478 (Ct. App. 1996))). 
As the district court noted, "[t]he party challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute must overcome a strong presumption of validity." (R., p.902 (citing State 
v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 
195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998))). Brink has provided no authority in support 
of t~1is argument that this statute violates any provision of either the federal 
constitution or the Idaho constitution. Therefore, Brink's claims under "Issue 
Three" were properly dismissed by the district court. 
Brink's fourth claim was that he was "denied expert witnesses, either by 
denial of an unconstitutional [sic] process of the trial court, due to ineffective 
assistance of the trail [sic] counsel or proceeding counsel, or denial of access to 
the court, prohibition of petitioner's first amendment right to assert an affirmative 
defense, and/or denied presentation of witnesses to establish evidence 
necesassaary [sic] for affirmative defense, justifiable homicide defense, or 
denied compulsory processes to complete and present any defense." (R., p.710 
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(capitalization altered).) Brink argued that if he had a forensic expert at trial, he 
"could have proven the distance [between Brink and the victim at the time of the 
shooting] through forensic evidence and pattern of blood, ballistics, and brought 
witnesses to clearly in all regards show residential statues [sic], theft of property, 
through proper investigations .... " (R., p. 713.) The only issue regarding this 
claim that is not procedurally barred is Brink's allegation that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because there was no defense expert witness testimony regarding 
forensic evidence, ballistics, or blood evidence. 
"In determining whether an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the 
underlying criminal action constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court 
may consider whether the motion would have been successful." Cooke v. State, 
149 Idaho 233, 246, 233 P.3d 164, 177 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Sanchez v. State, 
127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); Huck v. State, 124 
Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "If this Court determines 
that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, then 
generally counsel will not be found deficient for failing to pursue it and the 
petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the lack of pursuit." ~ 
Here, the district court rejected Brink's argument that his counsel was 
ineffective for not obtaining a forensics expert and found that "Brink has not 
alleged facts that show he was actually prejudiced by his counsel not presenting 
this [expert] testimony [regarding forensic evidence] during trial." (R., p.904.) 
Trial counsel filed a motion for a forensic expert, but that motion was never 
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noticed for hearing.4 (R., p.904; #34391 R., pp.216-17) Post trial counsel also 
filed a motion for a forensic expert, but the motion was denied because "the 
appointment of an expert would serve no legitimate purpose in this case." (R., 
p.904; 34391 R., pp.466-67, 474-86.) 
Brink has failed to explain how expert testimony would have helped him 
establish an affirmative defense in light of the other evidence at trial and his 
conclusory assertion regarding ineffective assistance of counsel regarding use of 
an expert is without merit because he has failed to establish prejudice. As stated 
by the district court, even "[a]ssuming that trial counsel should have pursued [the 
motion for a forensic expert], Brink has failed to establish the benefit that such 
expert testimony would have provided" and "Brink has made no proffer in his 
post conviction case as to what an expert would have testified to." (R., p.904.) 
Brink also failed to establish that he was somehow denied the opportunity 
to present witness testimony. The district court correctly found that "[t]o the 
extent that these witnesses would have offered some testimony to support 
Brink's defense in this case," the evidence would have been cumulative. (R., 
p.906.) In addition, Brink "failed to establish a reasonable probability that any of 
the proposed evidence would have affected the outcome of this case." (R., 
p.906.) Therefore, Brink's claims under "Issue Four" were properly dismissed by 
the district court. 
Brinks final claim was that he "was denied ineffective [sic] assistance of 
4 Trial counsel also filed a motion for a private investigator. (#34391 R., pp.188-
92, 205.) That motion was granted by the district court. (#34391 R., p.207.) 
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trial counsel and/or ineffective [sic] assistance of appellate counsel" based on 
numerous allegations regarding trial counsel's performance at trial and the 
"failure of Appellate counsel to raise all fo [sic] Petitioner's issues on appeal." 
(R., pp.716-17 (capitalization altered).) This claim likewise is without merit. 
"This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic 
decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those 
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 
906, 914, 265 P.3d 519, 527 (Ct. App. 2011). As such, the reviewing court 
"evaluate[s] an attorney's performance at the time of the alleged error, not in 
hindsight, and presume[s] that trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics 
were based on sound legal strategy." kl "Bare assertions and speculation, 
unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246, 233 P.3d at 177 (citing Roman 
v. State, 125 Idaho 644,649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
Many of the issues Brinks raises under this claim could have been 
addressed on direct appeal and are procedurally barred. Any issues that are not 
barred were sufficiently addressed by the district court. As the district court 
noted, Brink's allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were 
conclusory and "not supported by fact." (R., p.908.) The district court had 
already "reviewed the entire trial transcript" and found that Brink's claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel were meritless. (R., 
pp.901, 908-09.) Brink's allegations in his amended petition for post-conviction 
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relief and on appeal all involve bare assertions and speculation. These 
allegations are not supported by any specific facts from the record that would 
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Furthermore, "[e]ven accepting Brink's allegations of ineffective assistance 
of trial and appellate counsel as true," the district court found "that Brink failed to 
allege facts that satisfy the actual prejudice prong of Strickland" because he "has 
not made the required showing of a reasonable probability that, but for his trial or 
appellate counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of his trial would have 
been different." (R., p.909.) Brink has failed to show any objective deficiency or 
prejudice arising from his trial counsel's strategic decisions or his appellate 
counsel's alleged failure to raise all of the issues Brink wanted to raise on 
appeal. Therefore, Brink's claims under "Issue Five" were properly dismissed by 
the district court. 
Review of the record shows that Brink's claims for post-conviction relief 
were properly dismissed as either barred because they were or should have 
been asserted in his criminal case, or because Brink failed to present evidence 
showing a prima facie claim for post-conviction relief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of Brink's amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 25th day of July 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of July 2012, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DONALD SHANE BRINK 
IDOC #18964 
ICC Unit E 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
.. IMG/pm 
J~.._,_. __ 
Deputy Attorney General 
18 
